

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/18 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100210004-0

Page Denied

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-M-272

21 September 1983

Minutes
Special Meeting
Wednesday, 21 September 1983, 1330 - 1430 Hours
Room 7D64, Langley Headquarters Building

[REDACTED]
Chairman
Presiding

25X1

MEMBERS PRESENT

[REDACTED] Department of Navy
[REDACTED] Office of the Secretary of Defense
[REDACTED] Department of Energy
[REDACTED] Department of the Air Force
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] National Security Agency
[REDACTED] Department of the Army
[REDACTED] Department of Justice

25X1

ALSO PRESENT

[REDACTED] Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], Department of the Treasury
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Office of the Secretary of Defense
[REDACTED] Department of State
[REDACTED] Department of the Army
[REDACTED] Department of State
[REDACTED] Executive Secretary, SECOM

25X1

25X1

SECOM Staff

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

Proposed Addition to Paragraph 5 of DCID 1/14

Completion of a counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examination¹, or written agreement to take such an examination when requested, is a condition of access to SCI. For individuals with no previous access to classified information, and when there is no known basis for counterintelligence concern, the counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examination may be administered after they have been granted SCI access and have had an opportunity to establish a basis for testing.

¹ Counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examinations shall cover such items as falsification of personal history data; unauthorized disclosure of classified information; involvement in espionage, sabotage or subversion for a foreign power; unreported contacts or associations with foreign intelligence services and foreign governments; and knowledge of unauthorized disclosures, espionage or foreign intelligence or government contacts by others known to the individual which the individual has not reported to the U.S. Government.



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

POLICY

21 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Uniform Personnel Security Standards for Access to Intelligence Sources and Product


Pursuant to discussion concerning a suggestion that the DCI Security Committee adopt uniform personnel security standards for access to intelligence source and product information that would include a requirement for a counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examination of Department of Defense personnel, the following comments are offered.

The Defense Authorization Bill recently enacted by both Houses of Congress contains a pertinent amendment, quoted in part:

Sec. 1007. (a) The Secretary of Defense may not, before April 15, 1984, use, enforce, issue, implement, or otherwise rely on any rule, regulation, directive, policy, decision, or order that would permit the use of polygraph examinations in the case of civilian employees of the Department of Defense or members of the Armed Forces in any manner or to any extent greater than was permitted under rules, regulations, directives, policies, decisions, or orders of the Department of Defense in effect on August 5, 1982.

In addition, there are a number of Congressional hearings pending during which the polygraph policy of the Department of Defense, both extant and proposed, will be examined. Further, the National Security Council is considering whether formulation of a national policy concerning use of the polygraph might be feasible.

Under these conditions and circumstances, I cannot commit the Department of Defense to uses of the polygraph that go beyond those in force on August 5, 1982, which are embodied in the current Defense policy as recorded in DoD Directive 5210.48. Therefore, I cannot concur in uniform personnel security standards proposed for use to protect intelligence sources and product data that include a requirement for a polygraph examination of any employees of the Department of Defense.


Maynard C. Anderson
Director
Security Plans and Programs

Copy to:
DUSD(P)